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of Denver. Any  analysis  of  the  role  innovation  plays  in  economic  development  must  acknowledge  Joseph 
Schumpeter,  as  must  any  mention  of  the  importance  of  the  “creative  destruction”  occasioned 
by  technological  advance.  Furthermore,  recent  work  by  “Circuitistes”2  and  Post  Keynesians 
has  also  acknowledged  the  important  contributions  made  by  Schumpeter  to  monetary  theory, 
and  especially  to  any  endogenous  approach  to  money  that  emphasizes  financial  evolution. 
However,  I  will  argue  that  the  current  stagnation  facing  the  US,  in  particular,  and  developed 
capitalist  economies,  in  general,  cannot  be  understood  without  synthesizing  Schumpeter’s 
insights  with  those  of  Kalecki  and  Keynes.  Most  importantly,  Schumpeter’s  work  ignores  the 
role  played  by  government  deficits  in  maintaining  aggregate  demand  and  entrepreneurial 
profits,  and  his  theory  of  the  monetary  circuit  can  be  improved  through  the  introduction  of 
liquidity  preference  theory. 
We  might  begin  with  a  Schumpeterian  characterization  of  capitalist  economic 
development  as  “creative  destruction”;  new  technologies  come  along  that  “destroy”  the 
productivity  of  old  technologies  (not  always  in  a physical  sense,  but  in  a profits  sense).  Of 
’ Presented  at  the  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  Conference  on  Restoring  America’s 
Economic  Growth  and  International  Competitiveness.  This  is  an  extended  version  of  a  short 
paper  that  is  forthcoming  in  Monnaie  et  Production,  Economies  et  Societes.  I  would  like  to 
thank  Jan  Kregel,  Dimitri  Papadimitiou,  and  Alain  Parguez  for  helpful  comments. 
’ The  Circuit  Approach  is  a Keynesian  approach  that  emphasizes  circular  flow  analysis;  it 
is  closely  related  to  the  Post  Keynesian  approach,  but  typically  concentrates  on  money  as  a 
flow  of  finance,  rather  than  on  money  as  a stock  held  to  satisfy  liquidity  preference.  Most 
the  practioners  of  the  approach  are  in  France  and  Italy;  see  Bellofiore  (1992),  Graziani 
(1990),  and  Wray  (1991a). 
of course,  new  technologies  will  not  be  automatically  adopted;  if  firms  with  market  power  have 
substantial  excess  capacity,  they  will  not  destroy  the  old  technology,  but  wars  and  internal 
and  external  competition  sometimes  do  encourage  this  creative  destruction.  However,  as 
positions  in  long-lived  capital  must  be  financed,  destruction  of  capital  values  also  means  that 
liabilities  must  be  absorbed  and  losses  incurred.  The  willingness  and  ability  to  absorb  such 
losses  depend  on  current  and  prospective  income  flows  and  balance  sheet  positions.  These,  in 
turn,  are  at  least  partially  a  function  of  past,  current,  and  expected  future  aggregate  demand. 
Finally,  these  are  a function  to  some  extent  of  government  spending  and  expected  growth  of 
government  spending.  The  current  situation  in  the  US  (and  in  all  other  capitalist  economies) 
is  one  of  massive  excess  capacity,  depressed  aggregate  demand,  a huge  “debt-overhang”  and 
fragile  financial  positions,  and  governments  that  are  engaging  in  austerity.3  Thus,  in  this 
situation,  firms  are  not  able  to  absorb  the  losses  that  would  be  necessary  to  engage  in 
“creative  destruction”:  scrapping  plant  and  equipment  and  replacing  it  with  new  technologies. 
Under  these  circumstances,  capitalist  efforts  are  directed  elsewhere--capitalists  are  never 
interested  in  production,  per  se,  rather,  they  are  interested  in  monetary  profits.  Schumpeter’s 
innovators  have  thus  turned  their  attention  to  financial  markets  where  expected  returns  exceed 
those  of  the  productive  sphere.  Keynes’s 
understanding  of  the  determinants  of  the 
directs  capitalist  efforts. 
liquidity  preference  theory  increases  our 
relative  price  system  for  assets--which,  in  turn, 
3 For  a discussion  of  the  current  world-wide  stagnation,  see  Kregel  (1993).  The  U.N. 
predicts  that  output  of  the  developed  “market-economy”  countries  will  grow  by  only  0.8%  in 
1993;  that  of  the  European  Economic  Community  will  shrink  by  0.5%;  and  that  of  Germany 
will  fall  by  1.7%.  Source:  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development,  Trade  and 
Development  Report,  1993,  p.  4.  In  the  same  report,  it  is  argued  that  the  international  debt 
crisis  is  far  from  finished,  with  external  debt  of  developing  nations  hindering  development, 
with  troubled  loans  reducing  bank  wilhngness  to  lend,  and  with  large  and  rising  government 
debts  in  most  industrialized  countries  preventing  application  of  traditional  “Keynesian” 
policies  to  end  the  world-wide  recession. 
2 The  “miracles”  of  Japan,  Italy,  and  West  Germany--which  were  partially  a  result  of  the 
“creative”  destruction  of  WWII,  but  also  the  result  of  robust  financial  systems,  liquid  balance 
sheets,  and  US  trade  deficits--have  come  to  an  end,  The  only  solution  now  is  a massive, 
world-wide  stimulation  of  aggregate  demand  in  order  to  restore  expectations,  to  allow  losses 
to  be  absorbed,  and  to  raise  capacity  utilization  sufficiently  that  demand  prices  of  physical 
capital  will  rise  above  supply  prices,  redirecting  capitalist  efforts  to  investment  so  that  old 
plant  and  equipment  will  be  replaced  by  a burst  of  new  investment.  This  can  be  done  only 
through  a reversal  of  government  austerity  programs.  This,  in  turn,  requires  a  temporary 
massive  increase  of  government  deficits  among  those  countries  able  to  issue  debt  (the  “hard 
currency”  nations),  and  abandonment  of  Monetarist  policies  that  favor  financial  assets  over 
capital  assets. 
BRIEF  OVERVIEW  OF  SCHUMPETER’S  THEORY  OF  ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT 
Schumpeter  begins  with  an  economy  operating  in  the  neighborhood  of  a  “general”  equilibrium 
in  which  all  industries,  firms,  and  households  are  individually  in  a  state  of  equilibrium  in  the 
Walrasian  sense.  (Schumpeter  1944)  In  this  state,  the  economy  can  be  analyzed  as  a  circular 
flow,  where  purchases  of  the  output  of  the  flow  are  undertaken  on  the  basis  of  sales  of  labor, 
products,  or  services  &  the  flow,  and  where  purchases  without  sale  or  sales  without  purchases 
are  ruled  out.  In  this  case,  the  circular  flow  could  continue  unchanging  like  “the  circulation  of 
the  blood”.  (Schumpeter  1949,  p.  61)  While  money  might  be  used  in  the  circular  flow 
economy,  it  would  be  used  merely  to  facilitate  exchange;  it  would  function  only  as  a veil. 
Within  a  circular  flow,  individuals  can  act  promptly  and  rationally;  behavior  can  be  the  result 
of  cold  calculation  of  probabilistic  outcome.  The  capitalist  is  merely  a manager,  reacting  to 
the  “data”  ground  out  by  the  circular  flow  economy. 
Of  course,  no  society  would  in  practice  remain  static;  there  are  three  types  of  factors 
3 that  induce  change.  First,  there  are  “outside  factors”,  including  changes  of  consumer  tastes, 
and  changes  induced  by  nature,  political  factors,  and so on;  second,  there  is  “growth”,  for 
example,  of  population,  work  force,  or natural  resources.  Schumpeter  argued  that  outside 
factors  and growth  merely  change  the data of the  system,  inducing  an adaptive  response  by 
individuals,  including  capitalists.  Such changes  can be analyzed  as continuous,  infinitesimal 
shocks  to the  circular  flow  that  lead to new points  of  equilibrium.  In this  case, the  “static” 
analysis  of  Walrasian  economics  is sufficient. 
However,  Schumpeter’s  focus  is on  “that kind  of  change  arising  from  within  the 
system  which  so displaces  its equilibrium  point  that  the new  one  cannot  be reached  from  the 
old  one  by  infinitesimal  steps” (Schumpeter  1949, p. 64), that  is, spontaneous,  discontinuous, 
and revolutionary  changes  to the  circular  flow  that  displace  it  so far from  equilibrium  that 
adaptation  becomes  impossible  and routine  must be abandoned.  His analysis  thus  concerns 
those  points  where  economic  life  itself  changes  its own  data by  fits  and  starts--changes  in 
economic  life  that  arise  by  its own  initiative.  This  is what he calls  economic  development, 
which  is contrasted  with  change  that results  merely  from  outside  factors  or growth--which  he 
calls  noneconomic  development.  (Schumpeter  1949) 
Economic  development  is the result  of innovation,  characterized  as the  carrying  out  of 
new  combinations  of materials  and forces  or productive  means.  It includes  introduction  of  a 
new  type  or quality  of  commodity,  introduction  of a new method  of production,  opening  of  a 
new  market,  conquest  of a new  source  of  supply  of raw materials  or intermediate  goods,  or 
carrying  out  of  a new  organization  of industry  (eg:  creation  or destruction  of monopoly 
power).  This  innovation  is the product  of the  entrepreneur,  who  swims  against  the  stream, 
putting  inventions  into  practice.  Schumpeter  emphasized  that  innovation  must be distinguished 
from  invention;  in  many  cases, the  entrepreneur  merely  borrows  inventions  that  have  not  been 
applied  precisely  because  they  represent  a break  with  routine.  The  innovation  is to break 
4 habits,  to  break  down  resistance  of  groups  threatened  by  use  of  the  invention,  and  to  get  the 
necessary  cooperation  of  capitalists,  managers,  workers  and  consumers.  This  is  the  role  of  the 
entrepreneur,  a role  that  cannot  be  a profession,  nor  can  there  be  a  class  of  entrepreneurs. 
Indeed,  Schumpeter  argued  that  individuals  view  entrepreneurship  as  a  step  on  the  road  to 
becoming  members  of  the  capitalist  class;  further,  any  individual  entrepreneur  who  is 
successful  in  this  quest  will  likely  settle  down  to  running  his/her  business  as  a mere  manager. 
(Schumpeter  1949)  Entrepreneurship  is  a function  performed  only  at  the  initial  stage  of  the 
carrying  out  of  new  combinations. 
Entrepreneurial  innovation  breaks  the  norm  of  the  circular  flow  as  it  requires  purchase 
without  sale;  it  requires  use  of  money  as  a  “claim  ticket”  on  productive  resources  without  use 
of  money  as  a  “receipt  voucher”  for  sale  of  commodities  or  services.  (Bellofiore  1985,  1992) 
Just  as  the  circular  flow  is  broken  by  innovation,  the  neutrality  of  money  is  broken  by 
entrepreneurial  activity;  indeed,  economic  development  requires  nonneutrality  of  money.  As 
Schumpeter  argues,  a  “nonexchange”  economy4  may  certainly  experience  change  and  growth, 
but  this  would  come  without  violating  the  neutrality  of  money.  For  example,  in  a  command  or 
socialist  economy,  change  would  be  directed  by  “authority”;  resources  would  be  redirected  as 
required  merely  by  command  to  generate  growth.  Money  might  be  used--but  it  would  be  used 
solely  as  a medium  of  exchange,  and  it  would  not  be  necessary.  However,  in  an  “exchange” 
economg,  resources  can  be  redirected  to  the  innovating  entrepreneur  only  through  provision 
of  new  purchasing  power,  that  is,  provision  of  money  as  a  claim  ticket  on  social  resources. 
The  innovator  cannot  rely  on  purchasing  power  that  arises  from  sales  of  output  within  the 
circular  flow;  rather,  resources  must  be  first  directed  to  the  new  and  revolutionary  activity 
4 Keynes’s  “real-wage  or  co-operative  economy”  description  is  superior--Keynes  1979,  p. 
67. 
5 Again,  Keynes’s  term,  “entrepreneur  economy”  is  better.  (Keynes  1979,  p.  67) 
5 before  this  activity  can  generate  sales  and  realize  money  as  a receipt  voucher. 
Schumpeter  believed  that  the  strongest  case  could  be  made  on  the  assumption  that 
within  a circular  flow,  all  resources  are  fully  utilized.  This  means  that  the  innovator  must 
draw  already  employed  resources  from  the  circular  flow  to  the  revolutionary  activity.  “The 
carrying  out  of  new  combinations  means,  therefore,  simply  the  different  employment  of  the 
economic  system’s  existing  supplies  of  productive  means...”  (Schumpeter  1949,  p.  68)  This 
would  make  it  clear  that  economic  development  could  not  be  a result  of  “saving  and 
investing”;  within  Schumpeter’s  circular  flow,  at  the  extreme,  saving  would  be  zero  as  all 
resources  would  be  employed  producing  consumption  goods.  Economic  development  would 
then  occur  not  through  volitional  saving,  but  through  creation  of  new  purchasing  power  that 
would  give  innovators  command  over  previously  utilized  resources.  Schumpeter  argued  that 
“saving  and  investing”  would  merely  lead  to  slow  and  continuous  increase  of  productive 
capacity;  it  would  merely  lead  to  adaptive  behavior  within  the  circular  flow.  Economic 
development,  however,  is  not  a  slow  and  continuous  increase  of  productive  capacity;  the  new 
combinations  cannot  be  financed  out  of  returns  from  previous  production. 
Instead,  economic  development  requires  creation  of  new  purchasing  power,  which  can 
only  come  from  credit  creation.  Credit  allows  “detaching  productive  means  (already  employed 
somewhere)  from  the  circular  flow  and  allotting  them  to  new  combinations”.  (Schumpeter 
1949,  p.  71)  Credit  forces  the  economic  system  into  new  channels;  “To  provide  this  credit  is 
clearly  the  function  of  that  category  of  individuals  which  we  call  ‘capitalists”‘.  (Schumpeter 
1949,  p.  69)  Further,  “the  capitalistic  credit  system  has  grown  out  of  and  thrived  on  the 
financing  of  new  combinations  in  all  countries”.  (Schumpeter  1949,  p.  70)  In  a capitalist 
society,  “credit  is  essentially  the  creation  of  purchasing  power  for  the  purpose  of  transferring 
it  to  the  entrepreneur”.  (Schumpeter  1949,  p.  107)  Thus,  innovation  requires  a credit  system, 
and  the  credit  system  is  a result  of  this  necessity.  The  banker  is  the  “capitalist  par 
6 excellence”,  the  “ephor”  of  the  capitalist  system,  as  he/she  produces  “the  commodity 
‘purchasing  power”’  that  makes  it  possible  to  carry  out  the  new  combinations  associated  with 
innovation.  (Schumpeter  1949,  p.  74) 
Since  credit  allows  purchase  without  sale  (of  previously  produced  goods  and  services), 
it  can  be  inflationary.  The  purchasing  power  placed  in  the  hands  of  innovators  allows  them  to 
outbid  mere  capitalists  for  resources  in  order  to  use  them  in  the  new  combinations.  The  “old” 
firms  will  command  fewer  resources;  their  output  may  well  fall.  However,  purchases  of 
resources  by  the  innovators  maintain  aggregate  demand  even  as  aggregate  supply  falls; 
inflation  of  current  output  prices  results--a  phenomenon  Schumpeter  calls  temporary  credit 
inflation.  After  some  period  (which  can  take  several  years),  the  new  combinations  can  finally 
put  output  into  the  market.  These  may  displace  other  (older)  products  and  services,  making 
them  obsolete  and  generating  a process  of  liquidation,  readjustment,  and  absorption  of  “old” 
firms.  At  the  same  time,  the  sales  receipts  of  new  firms  enable  them  to  retire  the  credit 
initially  advanced  to  allow  the  innovation  to  proceed.  As  a result,  loans  and  deposits  (“money 
supply”)  contract  toward  the  initial  position,  and  spending  power  and  prices  also  fall  back 
toward  initial  levels.  (Schumpeter  1944  p.  9)  Thus,  the  credit  inflation  is  only  temporary,  and 
the  innovation  can  even  lead  to  a deflationary  longer  term  trend  or  bias  as  it  reduces  costs  of 
production.  (Schumpeter  1949,  p.  111) 
This  is  what  Schumpeter  calls  the  “primary  wave”  as  the  economy  first  moves  away 
from  the  circular  flow  in  an  expansion,  but  then  contracts  back  toward  the  initial  equilibrium 
of  the  circular  flow  even  with  no  expectational  errors.  However,  as  firms  are  likely  to  react  to 
rates  of  change,  the  initial  expansion  of  purchasing  power  (and  inflation  of  prices)  can  lead  to 
a boom  driven  by  “mass  psychology”,  while  the  contraction  can  degenerate  to  recession  as  the 
economy  overshoots  the  circular  flow  on  the  way  down.  These  “secondary  waves”  increase 
the  instability  that  is  inherent  in  the  capitalist  economy.  According  to  Schumpeter,  only 
7 innovation  can  generate  the  business  cycle,  and  the  cycle  “seems  to  be  the  statistical  and 
historical  form  in  which  what  is  usually  referred  to  as  ‘economic  progress’  comes  about.” 
(Schumpeter  1944,  p.  7)  Innovation,  itself,  is  endogenously  generated  by  the  apparent 
tranquilitv  of  the  circular  flow.  That  is,  within  a circular  flow,  the  capitalist  is  sure  of  his 
ground  and  can  adjust  conduct  in  response  to  economic  data.  This  confidence,  however,  raises 
entrepreneurial  spirits,  inducing  experimentation  and  encouraging  innovation.  (Bellofiore 
1992)  Innovation,  in  turn,  generates  expansion  and  disrupts  conventional  patterns  of  behavior; 
it  becomes  too  difficult  to  make  predictions  and  entrepreneurial  spirit  is  depressed.  As 
Schumpeter  argues,  the  innovation  “changes  social  and  economic  situations  for  good”  as  it 
alters  the  data  of  the  system  and  moves  it  away  from  equilibrium,  and  makes  it  impossible-- 
even  for  the  new  entrepreneurs--to  predict  the  outcome  of  actions.  (Schumpeter  195 1, p.  217; 
Bellofiore  1992)  New  innovations  stop  coming  forward  and  the  economy  turns  downward;  it 
eventually  returns  to  a circular  flow  of  reproduction.  Schumpeter  argues  that  lack  of 
inventions  is  never  the  barrier  to  innovation;  rather,  it  is  the  lack  of  entrepreneurial  spirit  that 
would  put  the  inventions  to  use  in  innovative  ways  that  is  the  barrier  to  economic 
development.  Once  a circular  flow  has  operated  near  equilibrium  for  a  sufficient  period, 
confidence  will  be  restored  sufficiently  that  innovation  may  reappear. 
THE  CIRCULAR  FLOW,  LIQUIDITY  PREFERENCE,  AND  TWO  PRICE  SYSTEMS 
According  to  Minsky  (1992),  Schumpeter’s  vision  of  capitalism  as  a dynamic  system  that 
endogenously  generates  instability  and  cyclical  behavior  was  very  similar  to  that  of  Keynes; 
however,  Schumpeter’s  technique  was  essentially  that  of  Walras  and  was  inconsistent  with this  vision.6  In  contrast,  Keynes’s  technique,  particularly  that  of  his  General  Theory  was 
appropriate  to  the  Keynesian-Schumpeterian  vision  of  a monetary  economy.  I  will  argue  that 
Keynes’s  insights  can  be  added  to  Schumpeter’s  essentially  nonmonetarv  circular  flow  to 
make  his  “technique  ” “half-way”  consistent  with  his  “vision”.  In  the  next  section,  we  will 
introduce  Kaleckian  “technique”  so  that  a positive  role  for  government  deficits  can  be 
introduced  into  the  Schumpeterian  vision. 
Minsky  (1993)  notes  that  Schumpeter  was  able  to  integrate  money  into  his  theory  of 
innovation,  economic  development,  and  business  cycles;  however,  he  was  not  able  to  link 
money  to  “normal”  capitalist  production,  to  position-taking  in  assets,  and  to  formation  of  asset 
prices.  Indeed,  Schumpeter  denied  that  money  plays  a role  except  in  innovation.  As  such,  his 
circular  flow  analysis  was  severely  flawed,  his  analysis  of  banking  was  inadequate,  and  his 
theory  ignored  asset  pricing. 
On  the  other  hand,  Keynes  developed  a theoretical  apparatus  incorporating  nonneutral 
money  and  liquidity  preference  as  a determinant  of  the  price  system  for  assets.  In  Keynes’s 
theory,  money  is  used  in  an  entrepreneurial,  private  property  economy  because  uncertainty 
exists;  given  that  future  events  cannot  be  “known”,  and  given  that  production  and  sale  always 
require  time,  all  production  for  market  involves  fundamental,  existential  uncertainty.  (Wray 
1990,  1993a)  Any  time-dated  contracts  in  such  a society  will  be  written  in  terms  of  a money 
of  account;  because  virtually  all  contracts  in  any  private  property  economy  will  be  written  in 
6 In  private  correspondence,  Alain  Parguez  expresses  some  ambivalence  about  this 
distinction  between  vision  and  technique.  However,  he  believes  that  Schumpeter’s  training  in 
Walrasian  economics  constrained  his  circular  flow  analysis  to  one  of  an  attempted  marriage  of 
Walras’s  model  with  the  Austrian  approach.  Heilbroner  (1993)  critically  analyzes 
Schumpeter’s  admission  that  a  “preanalytic  vision”  must  shape  scientific  inquiry;  Heilbroner 
argues  that  Schumpeter  did  not  go  far  enough  in  recognizing  the  power  of  ideology  to  guide 
economic  analysis.  Schumpeter’s  own  “vision”  of  capitalism  included  room  for  both  buoyant 
optimism  regarding  its  innovative  entrepreneurs  but  also  pessimism  regarding  the  ability  of 
capitalism  to  survive. 
9 (and  legally  enforceable  in)  money  terms  only,  money  matters  and  can  never  be  neutral. 
Furthermore,  given  uncertainty  and  nominal  contracts,  liquiditv  always  has  value--holding 
money-denominated  liquid  assets  reduces  uncertainty  regarding  one’s  ability  to  fulfill  future 
commitments,  as  well  as  regarding  whether  one’s  income  flows  will  be  sufficient  to  meet 
expenditures. 
The  demand  for  assets  is  a  function  of  expected  returns;  Keynes  emphasized  that  the 
return  to  holding  any  asset  is  a function  of  q-c+Z, where  q-c  is  the  expected  “quasi  rent” 
(yield  plus  capital  gains--or  less  capital  losses)  minus  carrying  costs  and  I is  the  subjectively 
evaluated  return  to  liquidity.  According  to  Keynes,  in  equilibrium,  prices  of  assets  will  adjust 
such  as  to  equalize  expected  returns;  the  expected  return-primarily  I--of  the  most  liquid  asset 
(usually,  high  powered  money)  will  establish  the  standard  that  returns  on  all  other  assets  must 
achieve.  As  liquidity  preference  rises,  prices  of  illiquid  assets  must  fall  sufficiently  to  raise 
expected  returns  on  these  so  as  to  equal  the  new,  higher,  subjectively  evaluated  return  (2) to 
liquid  assets.  Thus,  liquidity  preference  is  a theory  of  value  for  assets;  given  expected  q-c,  the 
degree  of  liquidity  preference  uniquely  determines  the  demand  price  of  each  asset.  In  the  case 
of  producible  assets  (eg:  capital  assets),  the  demand  price  must  exceed  the  supply  price  in 
order  to  induce  production.7 
On  the  other  hand,  there  must  be  another  price  system  for  current  oumut,  whose  prices 
are  determined  not  as  a function  of  liquidity  preference  (and  expected  returns),  but  so  as  to 
recover  costs  and  realize  profits.  As  a first  approximation,  one  could  characterize  the 
Keynesian  theory  of  current  output  prices  as  a  “wage  plus  markup”  approach.  At  the 
7 See  Wray  (1992)  for  a detailed  analysis  of  liquidity  preference  as  a theory  of  value. 
Note  that  while  I have  interpreted  liquidity  preference  as uniquely  determining  asset  demand 
prices  given  q-c,  I  recognize  (as  did  Keynes)  that  the  degree  of  liquidity  preference  also 
affects  the  expected  q’s:  the  higher  is  liquidity  preference,  the  more  pessimistic  one  is 
regarding  the  yields  to  be  generated  by  illiquid  assets. 
10 individual  firm  level,  the  markup  will  be  a function  of  market  power;  at  the  level  of  the 
economy  as  a whole,  the  markup  is  a function  of  aggregate  demand.  This,  in  turn,  is  partially 
a function  of  the  relation  of  supply  prices  of  capital  goods  (determined  by  the  price  system 
for  current  output)  and  the  demand  prices  of  capital  goods  (determined  by  liquidity 
preference).  When  demand  prices  exceed  supply  prices,  investment  can  occur  which  raises 
aggregate  demand  so  that  a larger  aggregate  markup  on  prices  of  consumer  goods  over  wage 
costs  can  be  supported.  Competition  among  capitalists  then  determines  the  distribution  of 
aggregate  profits  realized  through  individual  markups. 
Alternatively,  given  a price,  an  entrepreneur  can  increase  the  markup  by  lowering 
costs.’  Through  innovation  that  lowers  costs,  an  individual  can  force  a greater  share  of 
aggregate  profits  to  be  allocated  in  his/her  direction.  Schumpeter  did  not  appear  to  recognize 
that  innovation  (or  cost-cutting)  by  itself  does  not  generate  profit;  rather,  profit  is  generated 
by  aggregate  markups  (which,  as  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  below,  are  strictly  the  result 
of  spending  in  excess  of  the  wage  bill  of  the  consumption  sector);  instead,  innovation  only 
reallocates  profits  toward  innovators;  indeed,  innovation  can  reduce  the  aggregate  of  profits  to 
be  allocated  if,  as  Schumpeter  believed,  it  lowers  costs--which  are  incomes.  Thus,  innovation 
directly  affects  only  the  distribution  of  profits  among  capitals.  It  is  through  this  redistribution 
of  profit  to  innovators  that  innovation  leads  to  “creative  destruction”  of  “old”  capital  by 
reducing  its  yield--when  yield 
is  taken  out  of  production.g 
falls  sufficiently  (eg,  below  “variable  costs”),  the  “old”  capital 
’ According  to  Schumpeter,  “the  competition  of  the  man  with  a  significantly  lower  cost 
curve  is,  in  fact,  the  really  effective  competition  that  in  the  end  revolutionizes  the  industry.” 
(Schumpeter  195 1, p.  223) 
’  As  Alain  Parguez  notes  in  private  correspondence,  the  innovative  firms  will  experience 
rising  market  prices  as  expected  future  profit  flows  are  capitalized.  These  market  prices  must 
be  denominated  in  money  terms--the  notion  of  a  “real”  value  of  a firm  is  meaningless. 
(continued..  .) 
11 Schumpeter’s  circular  flow  analysis  is undermined  by the  absence  of the recognition  of 
the relation  between  investment  and profit  and by the  absence  of  a distinction  between  the 
two  price  systems  that  exist  in  all  capitalist  economies.  Contrary  to what  Schumpeter  claims, 
investment,  saving,  profit,  and interest  are not  absent  from  a capitalist  circular  flow--a  circular 
flow  that  consists  only  of  consumption  goods  and in which  money  is used to  facilitate 
exchange  can only  be Keynes’s  “real-wage”  or  “barter” economy.  In a capitalist  economy,  a 
circular  flow  must  be monetary  because  the purpose  of production  in  a private  property 
economy  in which  uncertainty  exists is to realize  “more money  than  it started  with”.  (Keynes 
1979, p.  89) A circular  flotli  cannot  be described  as one  in which  all production  takes  the 
form  of  consumption  goods,  for this  would  leave  no room  for profits.  A capitalist  circular 
flow  must  include  production  of both  consumption  goods  a&  investment  goods;  the  wage bill 
paid  to produce  the  investment  goods  is a source of profits  when  it is spent on  the  output  of 
the  consumption  sector.  Investment  output,  in turn,  is a function  of  a divergence  of the  supply 
price  and demand  price  of  capital  assets, which  as discussed  above  is a function  of  liquidity 
preference.  Investment,  in turn,  generates  M  profits  and saving;  any  capitalist  circular  flow 
thus  includes  profits,  investment,  and  saving. 
Schumpeter’s  analysis  begins  with  a circular  flow  in  equilibrium,  in  which  the 
economy  merely  reproduces  itself.  This  would  require  that  investment  is just  sufficient  to 
replace  depreciating  capital;  net  accumulation  would  be zero;  income  receipts  exactly  balance 
expenditures  such that  money  is merely  used to facilitate  exchange.  Again,  this  is not 
consistent  with  a money-using,  capitalist  economy.  Given  the time-absorbing  nature  of 
production,  capitalist  production  begins  with  an advance  of  “money”  and only  later  can realize 
‘(...continued) 
Furthermore,  as discussed  later,  as nominal  market  values  rise,  these  allow  greater  leverage  of 
current  income  flows. 
12 “more  money”.  The  initial  advance  of  “money”  must  come  from  somewhere;  and  given 
uncertainty,  any  advance  of  “money”  is  made  only  on  the  expectation  of  “more  money”  later. 
This  is  why  all  monetary  contracts  include  interest;  and  interest  requires  that  all  monetary 
contracts  are  of  the  nature  of  “money  now  for  more  money  later”.  Schumpeter  correctly 
recognized  that  “capital”  is  not  a means  of  production,  but  is  a fund  of  purchasing  power  that 
can  be  created  “ad  hoc”  as  credit;  he  also  correctly  recognized  that  “money”  is  not 
“commodity  money”,  but  is  characteristically  credit.”  (Bellofiore  1985)  However,  he  did  not 
recognize  that  this  is  as  true  &J the  circular  flow  as  it  is  out  of  the  circular  flow  during 
innovation.  Even  within  the  circular  flow,  production  begins  with  credit  and  must  end  with 
“payment”  of  interest. 
It  is  now  widely  recognized  that  the  circular  flow  cannot  lead  to  sufficient  capitalist 
receipts  to  “pay”  interest  even  if  saving  out  of  wages  is zero  (enabling  capitalists  to  recover 
all  wage  bill  expenses).  (Bellofiore  1985,  Graziani  1990,  Wray  1991a)  As  I have  argued,  the 
loo&  of  circular  flow  analysis  requires  that  interest  be  carried  “on  the  books”;  the  circular 
flow  will  thus  grow  at  the  rate  of  interest--even  if  net  investment  were  zero.  In  any  case,  a 
static  circular  flow  is  not  consistent  with  the  characteristic  of  a capitalist,  money-using, 
society  where  the  object  of  production  is  accumulation  of  money-denominated  wealth.  All 
monetary  circuits  must  grow  for  two  reasons:  to  allow  nominal  accumulation  and  to  allow 
“fulfillment”  of  contractual  obligations  which  are  always  of  the  nature  of  M  now  for  M’  later. 
And  in  any  monetary  circuit,  credit  is  necessary  and  money  is  first  and  foremost  a unit  of 
account  in  which  contracts  are  written,  debts  are  denominated,  and  wealth  is  calculated.  While 
Schumpeter  is  correct  to  argue  that  credit  plays  a critical  role  in  placing  purchasing  power 
lo In  other  words,  the  “advance  of  money”  takes  the  form  of  the  acceptance  by  the 
“lender”  of  the  “borrower’s”  liability,  and  the  issue  by  the  “lender”  of  a  liability  used  by  the 
“borrower”  as  a medium  of  exchange  to  undertake  production. 
13 into  the  hands  of  innovators, 
required  in  every  decision  to 
and  non-innovative.” 
credit  is  also  essential  in  providing  the  purchasing  power  that  is 
engage  in  production--even  where  that  production  is  mundane 
The  degree  of  liquidity  preference  will  determine  interest  rates  and  demand  prices  for 
assets;  as  a result,  it  is  primarily  liquidity  preference  that  determines  how  much  greater  M 
must  be  than  M  before  credit  is  created  and  purchasing  power  is  provided  to  potential 
producers.  Prices  of  existing  assets  adjust  so  that  expected  returns  can  meet  this  standard; 
demand  prices  of  assets  to  be  newly  produced  are  similarly  determined  by  liquidity  preference 
and  only  those  assets  whose  demand  price  exceeds  supply  price  with  a  sufficient  margin  of 
safety12  will  come  to  the  market.  In  this  way,  liquidity  preference  sets  the  standard  return,  it 
determines  the  necessary  rate  of  increase  of  the  nominal  values  of  assets  and  liabilities,  it  is  a 
primary  determinant  of  the  pace  of  accumulation  of  productive  capital,  and  it  helps  determine 
where  capitalist  efforts  will  be  directed.  Lower  liquidity  preference  sets  a lower  standard 
return;  it  also  lowers  the  margins  of  safety  thought  necessary  to  guard  against  unfavorable 
outcomes.  This  means  that  more  projects  are  expected  to  achieve  returns  sufficiently  in  excess 
of  supply  prices;  in  particular,  new  and  innovative  projects  are  viewed  more  favorably  when 
downside  possibilities  are  given  little  weight.  In  this  way,  liquidity  preference  plays  a role  in 
determining  the  pace  of  innovation. 
According  to  Minsky,  “Schumpeter’s  banker  financed  the  creative  part  of  creative 
destruction”,  but  it  is  necessary  to  wed  this  view  of  banking  with  Keynes’s  theory  of  asset 
”  As  I have  argued,  it  is  simplest  to  begin  an  analysis  with  the  assumption  that  capitalist 
expenditures  on  production  costs  are  financed  through  short-term  credit;  in  reality,  however, 
some  portion  of  expenditures  by  individual  capitalists  will  be  financed  internally  by  sales 
receipts.  The  “genesis”  of  these  internal  flows  can  only  be  explained  by  credit  creation, 
however,  since  all 
See  Wray  1991b. 
‘* The  desired 
incomes  were  initially  generated  by  spending--which  had  to  be  financed. 
margin  of  safety,  in  turn,  is  a function  of  liquidity  preference. 
14 pricing.  (Minsky  1990,  p.  56)  The  innovative  investment  requires  not  only  that,  from  the 
perspective  of  the  innovator,  the  demand  price  exceeds  supply  price,  it  also  requires  that  the 
banker’s  risk  aversion  is  overcome.  In  order  for  an  expansion  to  proceed,  portfolio 
preferences  must  change  so  that  the  banker  is  willing  to  take  position  in 




banks  can  do  this  while  conforming  to  normal  practice  (regarding 
the  liabilities  issued 
position.  Up  to  some 
prudent  leverage 
and  credit,  interest  rate,  and  liquidity  risk).  Expansion  of  balance  sheets  beyond  this 
however,  requires  revision  of  banker  rules  of  thumb,  changes  of  conventions  regarding 
prudent  behavior,  and  even  creation  of  new  financial  instruments--in  short,  financial 
innovations.  Financial  innovation  is  sometimes  the  “monetary”  counterpart  to  Schumpeter’s 
“new  combinations”  that  will  require  finance  so  they  may  be  carried  out.13 These  financial 
innovations  require  a change  in  the  perception  of  what  is possible--Minsky  argues  that  every 
prolonged  expansion  will  lead  to  innovations  in  finance;  such  innovations  are  endogenously 
induced  by  success.  So  long  as  investment.  continues  to  increase,  profits  increase  and 
encourage  greater  leveraging  of  prospective  income  flows;  this  leads  to  a  self-fulfilling 
prophecy  as  dependence  on  external  finance  increases  the  size  of  the  circular  flow  such  that 
incomes  are  even  greater  than  expected  so  that  margins  of  safety  for  the  next  round  of 
spending  can  be  reduced.14 
Innovations,  whether  by  bankers  or  by  industrialists,  can  create  market  power  and 
change  the  allocation  of  aggregate  profits  such  as  to  reward  innovation.  Prospective  monopoly 
I3 It  must  be  emphasized,  however,  that  an  industrial  innovation  often  can  be  financed 
through  conventional  banking  procedure--thus,  financial  innovation  is  not  normally  a 
necessary  prerequisite  to  industrial  innovation. 
l4 I have  argued  that  economic  growth  is  made  possible  only  by  deficit  spending  that  is 
not  intermediated  spending--that  is,  by  deficits  which  are  not  constrained  by  prior  saving.  I 
defined  this  as  “net  deficits”.  See  Wray  199 1  a. 
15 profits  are  incorporated  in  demand  prices  of  assets--the  identically  same  capital  asset  is  worth 
more  to  the  firm  with  greater  market  power--and  in  the  market  price  of  the  firm  with  market 
power.  This  firm  can  service  a bigger  debt  load;  those  who  recognize  this  are  able  to  use 
prospective  monopoly  profit  share  to  support  liabilities  that  give  them  controlling  ownership 
in  the  firm.  This  recognition  was  behind  the  most  recent  merger  and  buy-out  wave  in  the  US, 
which  dwarfed  any  previous  wave  of  concentration  and  must  qualify  as  a wave  of 
Schumpeterian  innovation. 
Part  of  the  explanation  for  the  burst  of  innovations  that  allowed  greater  leverage  and 
lower  margins  of  safety  can  be  traced  to  the  “perfection”  of  lender  of  last  resort  interventions 
by  the  Fed  in  the  postwar  period.  Each  time  a financial  innovation  was  tested  by  a crisis,  the 
Fed  intervened  to  validate  it.15 In  fact,  the  Fed  is  only  the  most  visible  guarantor  of  private 
financial  instruments;  in  the  US,  the  government  (whether  the  Treasury  or  one  of  many 
governmental  agencies)  stands  behind  one-third  of  all  privately  issued  liabilities.  Whenever 
the  government  promises  to  substitute  legal  tender  for  a private  liability,  this  must  affect  the 
price  of  the  liability  as  it  increases  its  liquidity.16  Clearly,  individuals  can  reduce  margins  of 
safety  if  the  government’s  safety  net  is  extended  to  cover  virtually  all  liabilities  of  those  with 
market  power;  the  preference  for  liquidity  is  reduced  and  prices  of  assets  whose  return 
consists  primarily  of  q-c  are  higher. 
BIG  GOVERNMENT  AND  INNOVATION 
As  Minsky  (1990)  emphasized,  Schumpeter’s 
I5 See  Minsky  (1986)  and  Wray  (1993b)  for  discussions  of  Fed  intervention  during  crisis. 
l6 In  private  correspondence,  Alain  Parguez  defines  a  liquid  asset  as  one  for  which  there 
is  certainty  that  the  future  will  not  depreciate  the  price  of  the  asset.  A  government  guarantee 
of  a price  floor  for  an  asset  thus  gives  it  liquidity. 
analysis  can  also  be  strengthened  by  addition  of 
16 Kalecki’s  recognition  that  because  government  deficit  spending  enters  the  circular  flow  as  a 
capitalist  receipt  without  entailing  a cost  to  capitalist,  it  must  generate  capitalist  profits.17 
such,  increasing  the  government’s  deficit  must  (all  else  equal)  increase  the  aggregate  of 
profits  to  be  allocated  among  capitalists.‘8  Furthermore,  if  the  government’s  deficit  tends 
move  countercyclically,  while  investment  moves  procyclically,  it  will  stabilize  aggregate 
profits  and  help  to  tame  the  business  cycle  as  capitalist  income  is maintained  during 
downturns  so  that  they  are  better  able  to  meet  payment  commitments  negotiated  during 
expansions.  This  makes  it  less  likely  that  a downturn  of  investment  will  degenerate  into  Ll 
As 
to 
debt  deflation  which  would  require  lender  of  last  resort  activity  to  place  a floor  on  private 
asset  prices--thus,  by  maintaining  aggregate  demand,  the  government’s  deficit  also  helps  to 
put  into  place  an  asset  price  floor.  In  the  postwar  period,  central  bank  interventions,  Fed  and 
other  government  guarantees,  and  potentially  large  countercyclical  government  deficits  have 
all  contributed  to  higher  price  floors  in  the  asset  price  system.  Further,  higher  aggregate 
demand  generated  by  government  spending  allows  higher  realized  markups  for  current  output, 
which  also  feeds  into  the  asset  price  system  by  maintaining  current  and  expected  q’s 
generated  by  capital  assets. 
Innovation  means  concomitant  creative  destruction  when  it  involves  means  of 
production.  Schumpeter  argued  that  the  tvpical  case  involves  innovation  by  a new  firm  that 
generates  losses  incurred  by  old  firms;  these  disappear  if  they  cannot  work-off  the  liabilities 
associated  with  the  assets  that  become  depreciated  because  of  innovations.  Innovations  by 
I7 According  to  Alain  Parguez,  Schumpeter’s  neglect  of  the  government  deficit  as  a 
source  of  profits  is  only  one  aspect  of  his  more  general  failure  to  incorporate  a theory  of 
aggregate  effective  demand  within  his  theory  of  realization  of  profits  or  surplus. 
l8 This  follows  from  Kalecki’s  well-known  profit  equation,  derived  from  the  GNP 
identity.  In  the  expanded  form,  aggregate  profits  are  identically  equal  to  consumption  out  of 
profit,  plus  investment,  plus  the  government  deficit,  plus  net  exports,  and  minus  saving  out  of 
wages.  Jerome  Levy  (1943)  derived  a similar  result  several  decades  earlier. 
17 new  firms  are,  of  course,  still  common  and  important;  however,  the  typical  case  has  long 
been  an  innovation  by  an  “old”  firm.  This  does  not  mean,  as  Schumpeter  would  emphasize, 
that  the  invention  necessarily  takes  place  within  the  old  firm,  but  that  the  invention  typically 
can  only  become  an  innovation  in  the  hands  of  the  old  firm.  This  is  for  several  reasons:  the 
old  firm  already  has  market  power,  which  is  frequently  a pre-condition  to  obtaining  necessary 
finance;  the  old  firm  is  better  able  to  develop  and  market  new  products  through  its  knowledge 
of,  and  control  over,  final  consumers;  and  the  old  firm  commands  the  respect  that  is  necessary 
to  break  down  the  social  resistance  to  innovation  discussed  by  Schumpeter.  Thus,  contrary  to 
what  Schumpeter  claimed  about  early  twentieth  century  innovation,  the  typical  case  today  is 
innovation  by  existing  firms.  These  also  bear  the  costs  of  “creative  destruction”. 
Big  government  deficits  help  such  firms  to  bear  these  costs:  deficits  in  one  sector 
create  surpluses  in  another;  surpluses  can  be  “accumulated”  by  firms  in  sinking  funds  that 
allow  accelerated  depreciation  of  outmoded  capital  assets  and  writing-off  of  associated 
liabilities.  At  an  individual  firm  level,  the  fear  of  innovation  by  competitors  is  a major 
impetus  to  innovation  even  if  it  will  generate  large  losses  on  previously  purchased  capital 
assets;  however,  firms  with  substantial  market  power  may  face  minimal  threat.  In  this  case, 
big  government  deficits  may  play  an  essential  role  in  encouraging  innovation  that  will  destroy 
the  value  of  capital  already  in  place.  Furthermore,  as  a major  purchaser  of  the  products  of 
such  firms,  the  govemment  directly  and  indirectly  encourages  innovation.  Similarly,  through 
government  provision  of  public  investment  goods,  through  government  subsidies  of  private 
business,  and  through  other  methods  of  reducing  business  costs,  government  spending  can 
encourage  innovation  by  reducing  supply  prices  relative  to  demand  prices  of  capital  assets. 
Finally,  by  maintaining  aggregate  demand  even  when  the  private  sector  retrenches,  the 
government  reduces  the  possibility  of  drastic  reduction  of  cash  flow--allowing  firms  to 
continue  to  absorb  the  write-off  resulting  from  “creative  destruction”. 
18 On  the  other  hand,  the  high  price  floors,  lower  liquidity  preference,  and  reduced 
margins  of  safety  that  result  from  the  combination  of  big  government  deficits  and  lender  of 
last  resort  activity  lead  to  close  articulation  of  income  flows  and  payment  commitments.  This 
means  that  very  little  gross  revenue  is  left  to  write-off  assets  that  have  been  creatively 
destroyed  unless  the  future  proves  better  than  expected.  Jn  the  presence  of  substantial  market 
power,  highly  leveraged  balance  sheets  can  reduce  the  incentive  to  engage  in  industrial 
innovation.  This  is particularly  true  when  capital  assets  are  expensive  and  long-lived;  and 
even  more  so  when  the  normal  case  is  massive  excess  capacity--as  is  common  when 
oligopolists  plan  excess  capacity  as part  of  their  strategy  to  maintain  market  share  in  periods 
of  above-normal  demand.  Given  the  heavy  indebtedness  of  US  firms  today,  it  will  take  time 
for  them  to  work-off  leveraged  positions  before  another  wave  of  innovation  in  the  productive 
(or  nonfinancial)  sphere  can  occur. 
In  Schumpeter’s  view,  the  proto-typical  function  of  the  banker  is  to  provide  finance 
for  innovative,  new,  combinations  of  resources--that  is,  investment  finance.  As  Minsky  notes, 
this  was  perhaps  true  in  the  early  years  of  this  century  (when  Schumpeter  was  forming  his 
theory  of  capitalist  development);  Minsky  calls  this  stage  “Finance  Capitalism”.  (Minsky 
1993)  This  was  a period  during  which  long-lived  and  expensive  capital  required  large 
investments;  investment  bankers  played  an  essential  role  in  underwriting  new  stock  and  bond 
issues.  The  first  great  wave  of  mergers,  trusts,  cartels,  and  monopolies  began  during  this 
period--encouraged  by  the  investment  bankers--to  protect  the  cash  flows  that  were  required  to 
service  the  substantial  debt  issued  to  take  positions  in  the  assets.  Thus,  Schumpeter’s  view  of 
the  investment  banker  as  the  “ephor”  of  the  capitalist  system  was  clearly  shaped  by  this 
particular  period. 
However,  previous  to  the  Finance  Capitalism  stage,  as  Minsky  argues,  bankers 
primarily  provided  short  term  working  capital  and  avoided  equity  investments  (except  as 
19 individuals  investing  their  own  funds).  Minsky  denotes  this  the  era of  Commercial  Capitalism; 
I have  elsewhere  (Wray  1990) argued  that  during  this  stage, bankers  provided  short  term 
loans  that  generated  the  surpluses  used by  individual  capitalists  to intemallv  finance  positions 
in  assets.  Given  the relatively  inexpensive  capital  assets of the period,  investment  could  be 
funded  readily  out of retained  earnings.  The  late  19th century  Schumpeterian  waves  of 
innovation  (for  example,  in railroads)  ended  the period  of  Commercial  Capitalism  because  the 
positions  to be financed  were too  great to be handled  in this  manner. 
Minsky  argues  that  the  Great  Crash  ended the period  of Finance  Capitalism;  it became 
apparent  that  the barriers  to entry  erected  by  trusts were not  sufficient  to protect  cash  flows  so 
that  debt  deflation  could  be avoided.  The  combination  of government  guarantees  of  asset 
prices  (Fed  as lender  of  last resort,  guarantees  by various  government  agencies--such  as FHA- 
guaranteed  mortgages--and  so on)  and potentially  large  government  deficits  eliminated  the 
possibility  of debt  deflation,  ushering  in the age Minsky  calls  Managerial  Capitalism.  Further, 
the profit  flows  generated  at the micro  level  by huge  firms  with  market  position  and  at the 
macro  level  by  government  deficits  made  it possible,  again,  to use retained  earnings  to 
finance  investment.  Banks  returned  to the more  traditional  activity  of  commercial  banking.” 
The  megacorp,  not  the banker,  became  the ephor  of capitalism.  With  various  policies  that 
promoted  high  US domestic  demand,  the megacorp  could  safely  undertake  expensive,  long- 
lived  projects;  in these  circumstances,  the orientation  of  capitalists  and their  management  was 
toward  the  “long run”.  With  protection  from  competition,  with  government  intervention  to 
prevent  failure,  and with  bureaucratization,  however,  the megacorp  became  complacent;  the 
manager  replaced  Schumpeter’s  entrepreneur. 
l9 One  should  also recognize  the role  that  the New Deal  banking  reforms  played  in 
redirecting  bank  efforts  toward  commercial  banking. 
20 MONEY  MANAGER  CAPITALISM  AND  THE  CURRENT  STAGNATION 
Over  the  run  of  good  times  after  WWII,  margins  of  safety  were  reduced  and  the  level 
of  indebtedness  rose.  Owners  or  management  that  increased  leverage  ratios  could  increase  the 
value  of  the  firm;  the  new  innovations  were  in  the  financial  sphere,  where  the  clever 
“Milkens”  took  full  advantage  of  the  recognition  that  a greater  portion  of  future  earnings 
could  be  transformed  into  debt  today.20  With  the  growth  of  pension  funds  and  other 
“managed  money”,  huge  blocks  of  funds  in  search  of  short  term  returns  were  available  for 
leveraging  expected  income  flows.  (Minsky  1993)  In  an  environment  of  rising  asset  prices, 
capital  gains--and  expectations  of  capital  gains--came  to  dominate  expected  returns  (q-c); 
given  the  low  value  assigned  to  liquidity,  highly  liquid  assets  were  not  in  demand. 
“Speculation”  replaced  Schumpeter’s  economic  development  because  the  expected  returns 
from  capital  assets  could  not  compete  with  the  capital  gains  to  be  realized  from  leveraging 
firms  to  increase  stock  prices. 
In  this  stage,  Money  Manager  Capitalism,  the  investment  bankers  became  highly 
leveraged  dealers  in  securities--taking  positions  and  making  markets.  (Minsky  1993)  Banks 
continually  lost  their  share  of  the  commercial  market  as  firms  with  market  power  turned  to 
commercial  paper  and  other  instruments  to  raise  short  term  working  capital  (again,  this  was 
made  possible  partially  by  the  reduced  value  assigned  to  liquidity);  when  a mini-crisis 
occurred  in  the  commercial  paper  market  in  the  early  197Os, it  became  standard  practice  for 
such  firms  to  negotiate  credit  lines  with  bankers  to  stand  behind  the  paper.  Banks  also 
provided  refinancing  for  the  financial  houses  dealing  in  securities.  However,  commercial 
banks  declined  further  in  importance,  becoming  further  removed  from  Schumpeter’s  “ephor” 
2o Thus,  financial  innovations  have  been  diverted  from  their  Schumpeterian  “supporting” 
role,  entirely  freed  from  industrial  pursuits. 
21 of  capitalism.21 
The  great  experiment  in  Monetarism,  begun  in  1979  by  Chairman  Volcker  (and 
continued  by  Chairman  Greenspan)  used  tight  money  policy  to  slow  the  economy  in  an 
attempt  to 
attempt  to 
fight  inflation.  This  was  combined  with  Supply  Side  economics  to  cut  taxes  in  an 
stimulate  entrepreneurship,  along  with  a military  build-up  to  fight  Communism. 
However,  the  net  result  of  “Reaganomics”  was  an  immediate  sharp  contraction  of  the 
economy,  with  investment  in  capital  assets  plummeting  and  with  massive  losses  by  banks  and 
thrifts  (due  to  rapidly  rising  interest  rates  on  liabilities  but  only  slowly  rising  rates  earned  on 
assets).22 On the  other  hand,  the  government  deficit  grew  very  rapidly  due  to the 
combination  of  tax  cuts and increased  spending  (resulting  from  defense  spending  and  from 
mandated  increases  of  social  spending--primarily  for  social  security  and health  care).23 At 
the  same  time,  the  US trade  balance  moved  from  surplus  to deficit,  at least  in part due  to 
appreciation  of  the  dollar  caused by  high  interest  rates.24 In  summary,  although  fiscal  policy 
2’ The  commercial  bank  share of  US financial  assets held  by  all  financial  service  firms 
fell  from  5 1.2% in  1950 to only  26.6%  by the third  quarter  of  1992. Over  this  same  period, 
the  share  of  assets held  by private  pension  funds and government  retirement  funds  rose  from 
4.1%  to 23.9%.  (Source:  Board  of  Governors,  US Federal  Reserve  System) 
22  Nonresidential  net private  fixed  investment  fell  from  $99 billion  in  198 1 to  $66 billion 
in  1982 and to only  $46 billion  in  1983; although  it recovered  somewhat--to  $102  billion  in 
1985--it  was only  $75 billion  in  1987. Source:  Wray  (1989,  p. 990), derived  from  the 
Economic  Report  of  the  President,  January  1989. By  1982, 85% of  thrifts  were  unprofitable 
and two-thirds  were  insolvent.  By  early  1992, the FSLIC  and RTC had  resolved 
approximately  1141 thrifts;  between  1985-90, more than  1000 banks  failed. 
23  The  deficit  grew  rapidly  from  $40 billion  in  1979 to  $79 billion  in  198 1 and  to  $208 
billion  in  1983; it then  rose to  $221 billion  in  1986 before  declining  somewhat  in the  later 
1980s. However,  by  1992, the deficit  surpassed  $365 billion.  Source:  Economic  Report  of  the 
President,  February  1992. 
24  The  multilateral  trade-weighted  value  of the dollar  (with  March  1973=100)  rose  from 
88 in  1979 to  143 in  1985; at the  same time,  the balance  on goods,  services  and  income  fell 
from  $5.6 billion  to  a negative  $107 billion.  Between  1946 to  1982, this  balance  had  been 
(continued...) 
22 was on  balance  stimulative,  monetary  policy  reduced  interest-sensitive  spending  and 
contributed  to the  creation  of  a trade  deficit.  Matters  were made  worse  by  similar  reactions  of 
other  countries  to inflation  in the  later  1970s and through  the  1980s. Tight  domestic  monetary 
policy  in these  countries  lowered  world-wide  aggregate  demand  and made  it impossible  for 
the US to  close  its trade  deficit.2s Furthermore,  countries  that  experienced  trade  deficits  also 
adopted  austerity,  further  lowering  world-wide  demand. 
The  supply  side tactics  did not  work  to stimulate  investment;  as Fazzari  (1993)  shows, 
net  non-residential  investment  as a percent  of  GDP since the recession  of  the  early  1980s has 
averaged  less than  half  of its post-WWII  averages--and  is now  near  its lowest  levels  in post- 
Depression  experience.  Furthermore,  neither  did  some relaxation  of monetary  policy,  which 
allowed  interest  rates  to  fall  in the mid  198Os, stimulate  investment.  Indeed,  in the most 
detailed  panel  study  of  investment  behavior  of  firms,  Fazzari  finds  that  even  a drop  of real 
interest  rates  of two percentage  points  has no  impact  on investment  undertaken  by  moderate- 
positive  in  all  but two years;  since  1982, this balance  has remained  large  and negative. 
Source:  Economic  Report  of the President,  February  199 1. As Kalecki’s  equation  shows,  a 
positive  trade  balance  adds to gross profits,  while  a trade  deficit  reduces  profits.  By  1987, the 
US trade  deficit  was equal  to 40%  of gross profits--representing  a massive  leakage  of  gross 
capitalist  income;  in the  same year,  the trade  deficit  was 78% of the  government’s  deficit. 
This  means  that just  over  three-fourths  of the  government’s  contribution  to gross profits  (the 
deficit)  was lost  in the  form  of  a trade  deficit.  Source:  Wray  (1989,  p. 990). 
*’ Movement  toward  the European  Monetary  System  and toward  integration  through  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  imposes  further  deflationary  pressures  on the EEC  countries.  At the  end  of 
1992, of  the  EEC  countries,  only  Luxembourg  enjoys  a positive  government  budget  balance; 
Italy  and  Greece  have  budget  deficits  equal  to more  than  10 percent  of their  GDP, the  United 
Kingdom  has  a budget  deficit  equal  to 6.6% of  GDP, while  even  Germany  has  a deficit  equal 
to 3.2%  of  its GDP.  Only  one  of the EEC nations  could have  met  the  fiscal  requirements  of 
Maastricht  in  1993; all of  the major  nations  will  require  “considerable  fiscal  retrenchments”  to 
meet  the requirements--an  optimistic  projection  concludes  that  the total  of  fiscal  adjustments 
required  amounts  to about  2.5%  of the  combined  GDP of the  EEC.  Source:  United  Nations 
Conference  on Trade  and Development,  Trade  and Development  Report  1993, pp.  75-84. 
23 to-high  growth  firms  and only  a minor  impact  on the  investment  behavior  of other  firms. 
Instead,  he  finds  that  sales growth,  and especially  internal  cash flows  are most  important  in 
determining  investment. 
After  1983, the  economy  began  to recover--unlike  previous  recoveries,  however, 
unemployment  remained  high  and investment  in capital  assets failed  to recover.26 As I have 
shown,  between  1981 and  1988, growth  of nonresidential  fixed  investment  accounted  for 
6 percent  of  quarterly  growth  of  GNP; indeed,  I found  that  over  this  period,  the  Reagan 
government  deficits  were  about  50 times  more  important  in generating  economic  growth 
only 
than 
was investment  in capital  assets.  (Wray  1989) The  Reagan  recovery,  therefore,  was neither 
Supply  Side, nor  Monetarist;  rather,  it was a stereotypical  (if  somewhat  perverse)  “Keynesian” 
deficit-led  recovery.  These  results  are similar  to those  of Walker  and Vatter  (1989),  who 
found  that  investment  in  capital  assets has not been  a significant  source  of  growth  of  GNP 
during  the  entire  post-war  period.  Instead,  they  found  that  government  spending  has  always 
been  the  engine  of post-war  growth:  when  the rate of  growth  of  government  spending  is high, 
the rate  of  growth  of  GNP will  be high;  when  government  spending  is not  growing,  the 
economy  stagnates.27 Furthermore,  they  found  that  it is the rate  of  growth  of  government 
26  Data  for  investment  have  been  presented  above;  the unemployment  rate  for  civilian 
workers  reached  9.7%  in  1982; it was still  7% in  1986 after  three  years  of recovery,  and 
reached  a trough  of  5.3% in  1989 before  rising  again  in the most  recent  recession.  In  contrast, 
the unemployment  rate  fell  as low  as 3.5% during  the  expansion  of the  1960s. Source: 
Economic  Report  of the  President,  February  199 1. 
27 Walker  and Vatter  (1989,  p. 340) present  the following  data  (all  in  annual  percentage 
changes),  showing  that  periods  of high  growth  of government  spending  are associated  with 
high  growth  of  GNP and of  investment: 
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24 spending  that  determines  nonresidential  investment  (particularly  in  the  case  of  equipment). 
They  attribute  this  finding  to  what  might  be  called  the  “Domar  Effect”‘?  investment  in 
capital  assets  increases  potential  aggregate  supply  (the  “capacity  effect”)  by  a greater  amount 
than  it  can  increase  aggregate  demand  (through  the  “multiplier  effect”).  While  some 
government  spending  also  increases  aggregate  supply,  Walker  and  Vatter  argue  that  it 
increases  aggregate  demand  by  more  than  it  increases  aggregate  supply.  Thus,  government 
spending  and  investment  spending  are  complements:  government  spending  is  required  to  raise 
aggregate  demand  sufficiently  that  the  capacity  generated  by  investment  can  be  utilized. 
The  Domar  Effect  can  be  given  a different  interpretation,  relying  on  Kalecki’s  insights: 
a government  deficit  adds  directly  to  capitalist  gross  profits,  allowing  them  to  service  debt, 
raising  entrepreneurial  spirits,  and  thereby  encouraging  capitalist  spending.  I  found  that  the 
“cash  flow  effects”  of  government  deficits  were  far  more  important  in  explaining  gross  profits 
during  the  Reagan  recovery  than  was  investment  spending.  This  is  interesting  in  light  of 
Fazzari’s  argument  that  corporate  cash  flows  are  an  important  determinant  of  investment,  and 
a greater  influence  on  investment  than  typical  “cost  of  capital”  variables  such  as  real  interest 
*The  High  Growth  period  is  a weighted  average  of  the  periods  1948-53  and  1960-68,  when 
the  rate  of  growth  of  government  purchases  was  high,  while  the  Low  Growth  period  is  a 
weighted  average  of  the  periods  1953-60  and  1968-83  when  the  rate  of  growth  of  government 
purchases  was  low.  Column  2  presents  the  rate  of  growth  of  government  purchases  of  goods 
and  services;  Column  3 presents  the  rate  of  growth  of  gross  national  product;  Column  4 
shows  the  rate  of  growth  of  gross  private  investment  in  structures;  and  Column  5 presents  the 
rate  of  growth  of  gross  private  investment  in  equipment. 
”  Unlike  other  growth  models  that  are  saving  and  supply  driven,  in  which  it  is  merely 
assumed  that  the  capacity  created  by  investment  will  always  be  fully  utilized,  Domar 
recognized  the  dual  nature  of  investment:  as  a component  of  spending,  investment  contributes 
directly  to  aggregate  demand  (and  indirectly  to  aggregate  demand  through  the  multiplier);  but 
it  also  raises  potential  aggregate  supply  by  adding  to  plant  and  equipment.  He  was  thus 
concerned  with  the  relation  between  these  two:  will  investment  raise  aggregate  demand 
sufficiently  to  keep  all  the  new  plant  and  equipment  operating  at  full  capacity? 
25 rates  and  investment  tax  credits  for most  firms.  Furthermore,  Friedman  (1988,  p. 264) notes 
that  corporate  after-tax  cash  flows  during  the  1980s were higher  than  during  any  decade  of 
the post-war  period:  they  averaged  8.7% during  the  1980s versus  7.5% in the  1950s and  8.2% 
in the  1960s and  1970s--a result  of  Reagan  tax cuts and deficit  spending.  In  spite of  this, 
nonresidential  investment  did not  play  a primary  role  in generating  the recovery,  for  reasons 
to be discussed  below. 
In  addition  to the role  played  by  government  deficits  and consumption  (and  the 
smaller  role  played  by residential  and nonresidential  investment)  in generating  the  Reagan 
recovery,  there  was also  a boom  at various  points  during  the  1980s in  commercial  real  estate, 
the  energy  sector,  the  stock  market,  junk  bonds,  and leveraged  buy-outs.  These,  in  turn,  were 
a function  of  changes  in tax laws,  deregulation  of the  financial  sector,  and innovations  in 
financial  practices.  Each  of these  increased  debt burdens  relative  to income  and wealth.  For 
example,  the  average  households  ratio  of total  borrowings  to yearly  income  rose  from  78% 
to 94% during  the  1980s (Alpert  1991). Corporate  borrowing  reached  record  levels  during  the 
198Os, even  though  by the  end of  1987, they  “owned no more  tangible  assets or financial 
instruments  than  they  did  at year-end  1980”. (Friedman  1988, p.  100) This  was primarily  due 
to debt-for-equity  swaps, which  ensured  that  by  1987, the market-value  of nonfinancial 
corporate  debt  equaled  75% of the value  of  equity--close  to the  78% reached  during  the 
depths  of  the recession  in  1982. (Friedman  1988, p.  101) Even  in the  face of  falling  interest 
rates  through  1987, increasing  leverage  ratios  caused corporate  debt  service  to rise  rapidly:  by 
1986, 56% of gross  corporate  profits  went  to interest  payments,  versus  an average  of  only 
16% in the  1950s and  1960s. (Friedman  1988, p.  100) As a result,  even  during  the  long 
Reagan  expansion,  both  the number  of bankruptcies  and the volume  of  debt declared  in 
default  rose  continuously  to record  levels  through  1987. (Friedman  1988, p.  101) Of course, 
similar  arguments  apply  to the  growth  of  federal  government  debt  and to the  effect  of tight 
26 money  policy  on  the  costs  of  servicing  that  debt:  at the  peak,  17%  of  federal  government 
spending  went  to  debt  service,  an  amount  that  was  approximately  equal  to  the  total  federal 
deficit.29 
Although  it is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  for  reasons  that  defy  logical  analysis, 
the  Fed  decided  in  the  late  1980s  that  the  expansion  had  proceeded  for  too  long  and  began  to 
tighten  monetary  policy  in  an  attempt  to  achieve  a  “soft  landing”.  Rising  interest  rates  raised 
the  portion  of  cash  flows  that  had  to  be  committed  to  debt  service  (by  households,  firms,  and 
the  federal  government).  The  corporate  “restructuring”  undertaken  in  the  euphoria  of  the  mid- 
1980s  could  be  successful  only  if  cash  flows  did  not  decline  and  debt  service  did  not  rise; 
Greenspan’s  tight  money  policy  that  began  in  1988  brought  on  a recession  and  resulted  in 
both  unfavorable  events.  In  1990,  the  assets  of  corporations  filing  for  bankruptcy  reached 
nearly  $83  billion,  or  50 .times  more  than  they  had  a decade  earlier;  much  of  this  was 
accounted  for  by  a small  number  of  huge  corporations  that  had  engage  in  leveraged  buy-outs 
during  the  1980s--“by  themselves,  the  ten  biggest  companies  that  failed  in  1990  accounted  for 
more  than  80%  of  the  years  bankrupt  assets”.  (Sherman  1991,  p.  123)  Ironically,  the 
bankrupt  included  Drexel  Bumham  Lambert,  which  had  “enticed  U.S.  corporations  into 
issuing  $200  billion  of junk  bonds”.  (Sherman  199 1, p.  124) 
As  the  US  economy  slowed  in  the  late  1980s  leveraged  firms  were  forced  to  retrench- 
-first  by  cutting  “unnecessary”  expenses  like  research  and  development;  next  by  “downsizing”. 
This,  of  course,  only  made  matters  worse  by  lowering  aggregate  demand  and  capitalist  cash 
flows.  It  also  increased  the  dominance  of  the  short  view  and  casino  over  the  long  view  and 
economic  development  as the  management  must  operate  so  as to  maintain  the  value  of  debt 
29  Unlike  the  case  of  firms,  however,  the  federal  government  cannot  go  bankrupt,  and  its 
spending  decisions  are  apparently  much  more  independent  of  its  income  flows  than  are  those 
of  firms  or  households. 
27 by keeping  the managed  money  happy--no  firm  can allow  a run  out of  its liabilities  to 
develop. 
The  demand  price  of  capital  assets depends  on past, present,  and  expected  future 
capacity  utilization  rates;  given  recent  and current  excess capacifl,  demand  prices  are too 
low  to induce  much  investment.  Furthermore,  as discussed,  the highly  leveraged  positions  of 
industrial  and  commercial  firms--in  some cases resulting  from  leveraged  buy-outs--will 
require  time  before  these  firms  can undertake  new  debt issues to finance  investment.  The 
current  problem  is not  one  of  excessively  high  liquidity  preference,  but one  of  low  expected 
q’s  for  capital  assets.3’ At the  same time,  illiquid  financial  assets can demand  high  prices 
even  with  low  yields  due to expectations  of  capital  gains.  Government  austerity  programs 
(Federal  deficit  reduction,  state and local  government  hiring  freezes,  social  spending  cuts,  and 
tight  money  policy)  hinder  aggregate  demand.  Monetarist  policies  that  threaten  to force  up 
interest  rates  at the  slightest  hint  of inflation  favor  “speculation”  over  “industry”  by keeping 
aggregate  demand  depressed  so that  financial  assets are preferable  to capital  assets. Inflation, 
of  course,  is not  a threat  to industry  (the ability  to administer  prices  is essential  for producers 
of  current  output  to ensure  that  costs are recovered  and debt is serviced)--it  is a threat  only  to 
rentiers.  In  summary,  firms  are faced  with  excessive  debt  service,  with  excess  capacity,  and 
with  world-wide  stagnant  demand  even  as Greenspan  worries  about  inflation.  Although  the 
government  deficit  remains  high,  which,  with  lender  of last resort  activity  prevents  an asset- 
3o  The  capacity  utilization  rate  for industry  averaged  only  80.4%  during  the  198Os, and 
peaked  at 84.2%  in  1989. By December  of  1990, it had  fallen  back  to  80.4%.  Source: 
Economic  Report  of the  President,  February  1991. 
3’  In  private  correspondence,  Alain  Parguez  concurs:  the problem  is a collapse  of  the  q’s, 
which  he  attributes  to a short run planning  horizon  of management  caused  by  an  “absolute” 
fear  of the  long  run.  He also notes  that  the  expected  q’s  are so low  that  even  low  interest 
rates  will  not  solve  the problem  of inadequate  effective  demand--experience  in the US during 
the  first  half  of  1993 appears  to confirm  this  belief. 
28 price  deflation,  much  of  the  stimulative  effect  of  the  government  deficit  leaks  out  of  the 
economy  in  the  form  of  a trade  deficit.  In  this  environment,  Schumpeter’s  innovators  must 
turn  their  attention  away  from  long  run  profitability  in  the  industrial  sector  and  toward  short 
run  capital  gains  generated  by  financial  asset  price  appreciation. 
POLICY  IMPLICATIONS 
Innovations  in  construction  of  plant  and  equipment,  and  innovations  in  production  have  made 
it possible  to  set  up  new  factories  (primarily  for  the  production  of  consumer  goods)  quickly 
virtually  anywhere  in  the  world;  removal  of  trade  restrictions  has  allowed  manufacturers  to 
locate  plants  wherever  conditions  are  most  favorable;  and  innovations  in  finance  that  allow  a 
large  firm  to  issue  customized  liabilities  to  suit  market  preferences  (including  the  currency  in 
which  they  are  denominated)  have  made  it  financially  possible  to  relocate  virtually  anywhere. 
“Internationalization”  has  increased  competition  for  market  share  and  increased  reliance  on 
export-led  growth.  This  has  tended  to  increase  excess  capacity  for  production  of  many 
consumer  goods  even  as  it  generates  depressed  world-wide  aggregate  demand.  Clearly,  if 
firms  locate  in  low-wage,  low-cost  countries,  causing  loss  of jobs  in  high-wage,  high-cost 
countries,  world  aggregate  demand  is  depressed.32  Furthermore,  if  countries  purposely  limit 
domestic  demand  through  austerity  programs  in  an  attempt  to  grow  through  exports,  aggregate 
32 If,  as  many  expect,  NAFTA  leads  to  an  exodus  of  manufacturing  jobs  to  Mexico, 
aggregate  demand  in  the  U.S.  will  be  lower  even  if  the  disemployed  workers  find  service 
sector  jobs.  The  debate  about  NAFTA  is  obviously  symptomatic  of  a world-wide  phenomenon 
that  is  being  repeated  through  loss  of  Japanese  jobs  to  other  Asian  counties  with  lower  costs, 
and  through  loss  of  northern  European  jobs  to  lower  cost  southern  European  countries.  As 
Greider  argues,  “the  trade  debate  will  return  again  and  again  to  the  economic  dilemma  that 
low-wage  exploitation  produces  for  the  world:  too  many  goods  chasing  too  few  consumers 
with  not  enough  money  to  buy  them.  The  first  step  to  genuine  reform  is  to  kill  NAFTA  now.” 
(Greider  1993,  p.  92) 
29 demand  is  again  limited.33  Export-led  growth  can  only  be  successful  if  at  least  a portion  of 
the  globe  runs  commensurately  large  trade  deficits;  over  the  past  decade,  the  US  has  played 
this  role  so  that  Germany,  Japan,  and  some  of  the  newly  industrialized  (mainly  Asian) 
countries  could  experience  economic  “miracles”.  Given 
in  the  US,  the  government’s  deficit  has  played  the  role 
economy. 
the  depressed  state  of  entrepreneurship 
of  engine  of  growth  for  the  world 
This  era  may  be  coming  to  an  end,  however.  Trade  deficits  and  loss  of  high-paying 
industrial  jobs  are  acceptable  only  with  an  adequate  social  safety  net;  this  net  has  never  been 
adequate  in  the  US  and  the  current  political  climate  will  inevitably  weaken  it  beyond  the 
dismantling  that  Reagan-Bush  were  able  to  accomplish.  Thus,  the  rest  of  the  world  cannot 
continue  to  rely  on  US  trade  deficits.  Similarly,  the  US  government  deficit  has  become  a 
major  political  issue  in  the  US;  attempts  will  be  made  to  reduce  it.  In  all  likelihood,  these 
attempts  will  fail--the  government’s  deficit  is  not  going  to  be  reduced  in  the  near  future  no 
matter  how  much  spending  is  cut  and  tax  rates  are  increased,  as  such  attempts  will  merely 
lower  aggregate  demand,  lower  tax  revenues,  and  perhaps  even  increase  social  spending. 
Paradoxically,  a balanced  budget  in  the  US  can  be  achieved  only  through  policies  that  would 
stimulate  aggregate  demand--something  the  US  appears  to  be  incapable  of  undertaking 
unilaterally.  A  coordinated  effort  to  stimulate  aggregate  demand  must  be  undertaken  by  those 
33 In  a very  interesting  paper,  Kregel  (1993)  argues  that  the  current  worldwide 
results  from  a variety  of  problems,  all  of  which  can  be  traced  to  the  failure  of  the 
international  monetary  system  adopted  at  Bretton  Woods  to  develop  a  symmetrical 
stagnation 
process  of 
adjustment  to  imbalanced  trade.  Like  Keynes  and  Davidson,  Kregel  argues  that  if  only  the 
trade  deficit  nation  is  forced  to  bear  the  cost  of  adjusting,  this  places  depressionary  pressures 
on  the  world  economy.  In  addition,  Kregel  argues  that  fear  of  the  inflation  that  might  result 
from  currency  devaluation  forces  countries  to  adopt  austerity  as  a means  to  reduce  trade 
deficits.  Movement  toward  Maastricht  will  only  increase  the  asymmetric  forces  contributing  to 
stagnation  since  countries  with  government  budget  deficits  are  forced  to  adopt  austerity  while 
there  are  no  pressures  on  budget  surplus  countries  to  stimulate  their  economies. 
30 countries  able  to  issue  liabilities  in  demand  (the  hard  currency  nations).  In  particular, 
Germany  and  Japan  must  stimulate  their  domestic  economies  and  share  the  “burden”  as 
engines  of  growth.34 
With  such  cooperation,  the  US  government  could  safely  increase  its  deficits  to 
stimulate  US  demand  and  to  provide  a market  for  world  output.  In  particular,  the  US  should 
move  toward  larger  trade  deficits  with  developing  counties  (particularly  those  with  large 
external,  dollar-denominated,  debt)  even  as  Japan  and  Germany  move  toward  trade  deficits 
with  the  US.  A  greater  portion  of  US  government  deficits  should  be  “money-financed”;  of 
course,  a  deficits  are  ultimately  money  financed,  but  most  US  government  debt  is  now  bank 
money  financed.35  This  forces  the  government  to  pay  interest  on  its  debt  that  is  bought 
(primarily)  by  banks  (broadly  defined),  which  then  finance  their  positions  by  creating  money. 
Federal  government  interest  payments  now  account  for  approximately  15%  of  all  government 
spending36;  this  is  wholly  unnecessary  as  government  short  term  debt  is  sufficiently  liquid 
34 Alain  Parguez  thinks  I  may  have  overestimated  the  paralysis  of  the  US  and  perhaps 
underestimated  the  ability  of  countries  with  “less  hard”  currencies  (such  as  France)  to  run 
deficits  and  stimulate  world  demand.  While  I hope  he  is  correct,  at  least  with  regard  to  the 
current  political  climate  in  the  US,  I  am  very  pessimistic  concerning  the  possibility  that  our 
leadership  would  take  unilateral  action  to  increase  aggregate  demand. 
35 In  1988,  more  than  half  of  all  publicly  held  federal  government  debt  (that  is,  excluding 
debt  held  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  and  US  government  agencies  and  trust),  was  held  by 
financial  institutions  (including  commercial  banks,  money  market  funds,  insurance  companies, 
savings  and  loan  associations,  credit  unions,  and  corporate  pension  funds);  of  the  remainder, 
state  and  local  governments  held  almost  16%,  other  companies  held  less  than  5%,  individuals 
held  less  than  lo%,  and  foreigners  owned  a  little  more  than  18%.  Source:  Wray  (1989,  p. 
992),  derived  from  Economic  Report  of  the  President,  January  1989. 
36  This  problem  is  common  to  most  industrialized  countries;  government  deficits  and 
interest  payments  as  a percent  of  GDP  for  selected  countries  are  as  follows: 
(continued..  .) 
31 that  it  need  not  pay  interest  (non-interest  paying  liabilities  can  be  issued  by  the  Treasury  or 
the  Fed  to  pay  for  government  spending).  This  would  help  to  reduce  the  share  of  US  income 
risen  secularly  over  the  past  three  decades-- 
to  consume  (and  a  high  propensity  to 
received  in  the  form  of  interest--a  share  that  has 
by  rentiers  who  generally  have  a  low  propensity 
specuIate).37 
As  discussed,  liquidity  preference  directs  profit-seeking  behavior.  Socialization  of  risk 
that  results  from  government  guarantees,  lender  of  last  resort  activity,  taxpayer  bail-outs,  and 
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Row  2 presents  the  governments  budget  balance  as  a percent  of  GDP;  all  of  t je  countries 
have  a government  deficit.  Row  3 presents  government  interest  payments  as  a  percent  of 
GDP.  Row  4  presents  the  primary  balance,  which  is  the  government’s  deficit  (as  a percent  of 
GDP)  net  of  interest  payments.  Both  Italy  and  France  have  budgets  that  are  nearly  in  balance 
if  interest  payments  are  ignored. 
37  As  a percent  of  personal  income,  interest  income  increased  from  about  7%  in  1965  to 
more  than  10%  by  the  end  of  the  1970s  and  to  more  than  14%  by  the  end  of  the  1980s. 
Federal  government  net  interest  paid  as  a percent  of  personal  income  also  rose  secularly,  from 
1.5%  in  1965  to  nearly  4%  in  the  1980s.  Source:  Wray  (1989,  p.  986),  derived  from  the 
Economic  Report  of  the  President,  January  1989. 
38 Interestingly,  in  the  US,  government  guarantees  are  almost  always  of  the  value  of 
liabilities  and  rarely  of  asset  values.  This  means  that,  for  example,  the  government  will  not 
guarantee  the  value  of  a capital  asset,  but  will  guarantee  the  liability  issued  to  purchase  the 
capital.  In  turn,  while  the  value  of  capital  can  fall  precipitously,  the  value  of  the  associated 
liabilities  cannot--this  enhances  the  demand  for  liabilities  of  firms  even  as  the  capita1  assets 
that  are  supposed  to  support  those  liabilities  suffer  depressed  value.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  this 
favors  speculation  over  industrv.  One  wonders3whether  industry  might  be  favored  by 
contingent  guarantees  of  capital  asset  values  rather  than  the  values  of  paper  liabilities. such  safety  nets  cannot  be  adopted  without  also  ensuring  that  individuals  can  suffer  losses; 
“healthy”  skepticism  must  be  maintained  through  institutional  practices  that  place  the 
individual’s  own  funds  at  risk.  Schumpeter’s  view  of  the  banker  as  the  “ephor”  who  creates 
and  allocates  purchasing  power,  and  Minsky’s  view  that  it  is  the  role  of  the  loan  officer  to 
raise  a  skeptical  eyebrow  as  he/she  asks  “Really?”  when  confronted  with  big-money-making 
schemes,  must  be  incorporated  within  banking  institutions. 
Finally,  we  must  recognize  that  the  primary  value  of  Schumpeterian  innovations  lies 
not  in  their  ability  to  enhance  productivity.  The  world  is  already  far  too  productive  given  the  - 
depressed  state  of  aggregate  demand.  (This  is  the  normal  case  under  capitalism.)  Rather, 
waves  of  innovation  directly  and  indirectly  (through  “spin-off’  developments)  raise  aggregate 
demand  sufficiently  to  move  production  temporarily  closer  to  capacity--encouraging  secondary 
waves  of  investment.  This  makes  it  clear  that  government  deficits  are  the  partner  of 
innovations,  required  to  absorb  excess  capacity  that  innovations  would  otherwise  create.  As 
Walker  and  Vatter  (1989)  demonstrate  convincingly,  government  spending  and  investment  are 
complements  precisely  because  the  additions  to  potential  aggregate  supnlv  resulting  from  new 
investment  exceed  the  aggregate  demand  created  through  an  investment  multiplier  process. 
Thus,  the  new  plant  and  equipment  can  be  operated  only  if  aggregate  demand  can  be 
increased  by  spending  that  does  not  contribute  to  productive  capacity;  government  deficits  can 
fulfill  this  role,  carrying  aggregate  demand  along  and  enabling  firms  to  meet  payment 
commitments  until  the  next  Schumpeterian  wave  of  innovation.39 
39  This  is  not  meant  to  imply  that  government  spending  does  not  raise  productive 
capacity-both  directly  and  indirectly  by  stimulating  investment.  For  example,  government 
spending  on  highways  certainly  adds  directly  to  productive  capacity.  Government  spending  on 
research  can  lead  directly  to  private  investment  spending  to  undertake  government  sponsored 
research,  and  indirectly  through  investment  in  “spin-off’  technologies.  What  is  important  to 
the  argument  is  that  taken  as  a whole,  government  spending  adds  more  to  aggregate  demand 
than  it does  to  aggregate  supply. 
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